Abstract-Signcryption is a cryptographic primitive that provides confidentiality and authenticity simultaneously at a cost significantly lower than that of the naive combination of encrypting and signing the message. Threshold signcryption is used when a message to be sent needs the authentication of a certain number of members in an organisation, and until and unless a given number of members (known as the threshold) join the signcyption process, a particular message cannot be signcrypted. Threshold unsigncryption is used when this constraint is applicable during the unsigncryption process. In this work, we cryptanalyze two threshold unsigncryption schemes. We show that both these schemes do not meet the stringent requirements of insider security and propose attacks on both confidentiality and unforgeability. We also propose an improved identity based threshold unsigncryption scheme and give the formal proof of security in a new stronger security model.
I. INTRODUCTION
Signcryption, proposed by Zheng in 1997 [14] is a cryptographic primitive which combines the functionality of digital signature and encryption. It not only provides authenticity and confidentiality in a single step, but also gives more efficient computations than the naive Sign-then-Encrypt and Sign-and-Encrypt approaches. Followed by the first construction in [14] , many new schemes and improvements have been proposed [2] [9] [3] [5] . Threshold Signcryption is a primitive which is the integration of threshold cryptography and signcryption. Identity based cryptosystem was proposed by Shamir in [13] . It provides a more convenient alternative to conventional Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) because it solves the problem of Key-Management and public key Certification, which were considered to be tedious in PKI.
In identity based threshold unsigncryption scheme, a signcrypted message can be unsigncrypted only when more than t members out of n members in a receiver group join during the unsigncryption protocol execution. Similarly, in identity based threshold signcryption scheme atleast t members out of a total of n members in the sender group jointly signcrypt the message. In both the cases t ≤ n. To the best of our knowledge, there were three PKI based threshold signcryption schemes in the literature [1] , [4] and [15] . Almost all of them have security weaknesses and these weaknessess were reported in [10] . The weakness in identity based threshold signcryption scheme by Fagen Li et al. was shown in [11] . Similarly, two identity based threshold unsigncryption schemes appear in the literature [7] and [8] . Both of them do not meet the stringent requirements of insider security. Even the security proofs are not consistent with the security model specified and no proof for existential unforgeability were given. Our Contribution: In this paper, we show the weaknesses in the schemes reported in [7] and [8] . Specifically, we show that, the identity based threshold unsigncryption scheme from pairings [7] by Fagen Li et al. is not CPA (Chosen Plaintext Attack) secure and is existentially forgeable. The identity based signcryption scheme with (t, n) shared unsigncryption [8] by Fagen Li et al. is not aCCA (Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack) secure and is existentially forgeable. We also propose an improvement for the threshold unsigncryption scheme in [7] and formally prove the security in the random oracle model. There is no formal security model for threshold unsigncryption in the literature, we have given an appropriate security model considering a stronger attack model for the system. We have used this model to prove the security, whereas the original scheme [7] did not give a formal treatment for the security of the scheme. (The improved security model and the proof of security of our new scheme will appear in the full version of the paper [12] , due to page restriction). We have also changed some notations in the original schemes to maintain notational consistency.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we briefly describe the basic tools used for the construction of the scheme.
A. Computational Assumptions
We use two computational hard problems Computational Bilinear Diffie Hellman Problem for proving the confidentiality of the system and Compuational Diffie Hellman Problem for proving the unforgeability of the system. The complete description of these standard and well-known problems can be found in [6] .
B. General Framework of Identity Based Threshold Unsigncryption
In identity based threshold unsigncryption scheme, a trusted central authority namely the private key generator (PKG) generates the system parameters. The private key corresponding to the identites in the system are generated by the PKG. In threshold unsigncryption scheme t out of n members in a receiver group should be able to unsigncrypt the ciphertext. On behalf of every receiver group, the PKG generates a group public and group private key using the group identity. It also generates n shares of the group private key and distributes one share to each member of the receiver group. Thus, each user in the system has his own private, public key pair as well as a private key-share if he belongs to some receiver group. For unsigncrypting the ciphertext, each group member generates the unsigncryption share using the group private key share given by PKG and the ciphertext. In a (t, n) threshold unsigncryption scheme, any t unsigncryption shares may be combined by a single legitimate user called clerk to unsigncrypt the ciphertext. A typical identity based threshold unsigncryption scheme consists of the following eight algorithms:
Setup(κ): Given a security parameter κ, the PKG generates the public parameters params, and a corresponding master secret key s.
Extract(ID A ):
Given the identity ID A of the user A, the PKG computes the public key Q A and private key D A , and sends it to the user through a secure channel. Here we denote the groups with the subscript notation A or B, depending whether it is a sender or receiver. The public key of the group G A is Q A and private key is D A .
Key-Share Distribution(D B , n, t):
Given the private key D B of user group G B , the number of members n in the unsigncryption group and t and the number of threshold members the PKG runs this algorithm to compute the private key shares ∆ i and the corresponding verification keys τ i of these n members, by using Shamir s (t, n) threshold scheme. Then each pair of private/verification key share (∆ i , τ i ) is sent to the appropriate receiver group member. Each member of the group can have independent private and public keys.
To signcrypt a message m to the receiver group G B , the sender A runs this algorithm and obtains the signcryption σ. The clerk runs this algorithm after verifying the validity of the shares from all the members of the group T B , to obtain the unsigncryption of the signcryption σ i.e. the plaintext m. Notations: From now on we represent Fagen Li et al.'s identity based threshold unsigncryption scheme from pairing [7] as LGH-IDBTUSC and Fagen Li et al.'s identity based signcryption scheme with (t, n) shared unsigncryption [8] as LXH-IDBSSSU.
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III. REVIEW AND ATTACK OF LGH-IDBTUSC
In this section, we review the identity based threshold unsigncryption scheme by Fagen Li et al.'s (LGH-IDBTUSC) proposed in [7] . We also show that it is not insider secure from CPA atack against confidentiality and is existentially forgeable.
A. Review of LGH-IDBTUSC
The LGH-IDBTUSC scheme involves four roles: The PKG, the sender A, the receiver group G B = {B 1 , B 2 , ..., B n } and the clerk -a member of the group who combines the unsigncryption shares from the other members, to unsigncrypt the ciphertext. Setup: Given κ as input, the PKG does the following:
• Chooses G 1 and G 2 of prime order q and a generator P of G 1 , • Chooses a bilinear mapê :
• Chooses s ∈ Z * q and computes P pub = sP .
• Chooses a secure symmetric cipher (E, D).
and s is the master secret key. Extract: The input to this algorithm may be the identity of an individual user or a group. The PKG computes the Q A = H 1 (ID A ) and the private key D A = sQ A . The extract procedure is same for both user and the group. Key-Share Distribution: Let t (a threshold) and n satisfies the condition 1 ≤ t ≤ n < q. The PKG performs the following
-Computes the private key share of each B i ∈ G B as ∆ i = F (i) and the verification key τ i =ê(∆ i , P ).
-Sends the private key share ∆ i and the verification key τ i to B i . B i then keeps ∆ i as secret while making τ i public.
Signcryption: To signcrypt a message m to the recipient group G B , the sender A chooses x ∈ R Z * q and computes the signcryption σ = (c, r, V ) as follows:
SignVer: This algorithm can be run by anyone who wants to verify the signature on the signcryption σ. Compute
r and accept iff r 
B. Attacks on LGH-IDBTUSC
Fagen Li et al. in [7] claimed that their scheme is semantically secure i.e. indistinguishable against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack, but it is not. In the following section, we show the weakness in confidentiality and unforgeability of the scheme.
1) Attack on Confidentiality by the clerk::
The proposed scheme is insecure from the point of view of attack by the clerk, who gets the shares from the members in the group to unsigncrypt the signcrypted message. The attack follows:
The members in the group give their unsigncryption shares of the signcryption σ to the clerk and the share used for obtaining the unsigncryption key k 2 is η i =ê(∆ i , Q A ), which do not include any part of the current signcryption σ. So, if the clerk is malicious, once he gets these shares from the threshold members in G B , he can use the same shares to unsigncrypt the ciphertexts being sent to G B from A, without requesting the unsigncryption shares from the group members and calculate the unsigncryption
where Remark: This attack is possible because the components of a specific signcryption is not bound to the computations done during unsigncryption share generation, so it will not be specific for a particular signcryption.
2) Insider attack on Confidentiality by an adversary : The scheme proposed above lacks the notion of insider security. As in the above scheme once the adversary knows the private key of the sender he can calculate the encryption key k 2 and then unsigncrypt the signcryption. The attack follows:
The adversary A knows the private key D A of the sender, so to unsigncrypt σ = (c, r, V ), where V = xP pub − rD A , he does the following:
Thus, it is not CPA secure. In the challenge phase of the confidentiality game, when the adversary A gets the ciphertext σ * , he can unsigncrypt σ * to find out whether it is the signcryption of the message m 0 or m 1 , because here the adversary knows the private key of the sender.
Remark: This attack is possible because the designers have not strictly followed the notion of insider security, so the adversary can easily retrieve the component used in the ephimeral key generation, and can thus recover the message without the need of the secret key of the receivers.
3) Attack on Unforgeability by a forger : Any can forge a signcryption from a user A to receiver group G B , if he has a valid signcryption from A to any receiver group G B . The attack follows:
The forger F, has a valid signcryption σ = (c, r, V ) from user A to the receiver group G B . He claims σ = σ to be a valid signcryption from the same sender A to a different receiver group G B . The signature is accepted if and only if it passes the verification in the SignVer algorithm. In this case, it passes the verification, as the equality
r . Thus σ is accepted by G B as valid, but it will be unsigncrypted to some arbitrary message, thus making it existentially forgeable. Remark: This attack is possible because the receiver's identity is not included in the sign verification procedure. Signcryption must include both the identities of the sender and the receiver and therefore omitting any of them in the encryption or the signature will lead to attacks in confidentiality and unforgeability of the system.
IV. REVIEW AND ATTACK ON LXH-IDBSSSU
In this section, we review the identity based signcryption scheme with (t,n) shared unsigncryption by Fagen Li et al.'s (LXH-IDBSSSU) presented in [8] . We also show that it is not insider secure against adaptive CCA atack on confidentiality and is existentially forgeable.
A. Review of LXH-IDBSSSU
The LXH-IDBSSSU scheme involves three roles: The PKG, the sender A and the receiver group G B ={B 1 , B 2 , . .., B n }, who co-operatively participate in the unsigncryption process.
Setup: This is similar to the LGH-IDBTUSC scheme in section III-A. Key-Share Distribution: This is also similar to the LGH-IDBTUSC scheme in section III-A.
Extract: Given an identity ID
Signcryption: This algorithm is run by the sender. To send a message m to the recipient group G B , sender A chooses x ∈ R Z * q and computes the signcryption σ = (c, r, V ) as follows:
• Computes c = E k2 (m), r = H 3 (c, k 1 ) and V = (x − r)S A . The signcryption σ = (c, r, V ) is then sent to the receiver group G B .
Unsigncryption: Let T B = {B 1 , B 2 , ..., B t }, be the group of t members who want to cooperatively unsigncrypt the signcryption σ = (c, r, V ). Each user B i does the following:
r and accepts σ iff
= ω j . If all the above tests hold, then σ j from B j (j = i) is a valid unsigncryption share.
B. Attack on LXH-IDBSSSU
Fagen Li et al. in [8] claimed that their scheme is semantically secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks with insider security, but we show attacks confidentiality and unforgeability of the scheme.
1) Attack on Confidentiality by an adversary::
The scheme is not insider security, that is if the private key of the sender is compromised during the adaptive CCA attack, the adversary will be able to distinguish between the messages m 0 and m 1 of the challenge signcryption. The attack follows:
During the confidentiality game, in the challenge phase the adversary A gives two messages m 0 and m 1 , the sender identity ID A and the receiver group G B to the challenger C and obtains the signcryption σ * = (c, r, V ) , where V = (x − r)S A . A computes V = V + rS A − rS A and queries to the unsigncryption oracle for the unsigncryption of σ = (c, r, V ) from the sender ID A to the receiver group G B . Now since this is different from the challenge signcryption σ * , the oracle will unsigncrypt as follows:
-Verify σ by calculating k 1 =ê(V , P pub )ê(Q A , P ) r , and this will be equal toê(P, Q A )
x which is the same one used for σ * , so it will pass the verification procedure.
-Now C will calculate
where
mod q, and this will be equal to
). Thus sends m = D k2 (c) to the adversary. This m, obtained is the same m b used in σ * . Thus we have proved that the given scheme is not CCA secure. Remark: This attack is possible because there is no binding of the sender's identity in the key generation part, so by just changing one component in the signature, the adversary can recover the plaintext used in the challenge phase by querying the unsigncryption oracle in the confidentiality game.
2) Attack on Unforgeability by a forger:: If the forger F, has a valid signcryption σ = (c, r, V ) from user ID A to the receiver group G B , A can produce a forgery σ = σ from the same sender ID A to a different receiver group G B . This is because it passes the sign verification procedure as the equality r
r . Thus the signcryption is valid from ID A to G B but it will be unsigncrypted to some arbitrary message, making it existentially forgeable.
Remark: This attack is possible because the receiver's identity is not included in the sign verification procedure.
V. IMPROVED ID-BASED THRESHOLD UNSIGNCRYPTION SCHEME (I-IDBTUSC)
In this section, we have provided a fix for the LGH-IDBTUSC scheme, to make the scheme semantically secure and secure against malicious clerks.
The improved scheme involves four roles: The PKG, the sender A, the receiver group G B = {B 1 , B 2 , . .., B n } and the clerk -a member of the group who combines the unsigncryption shares from the other members, to unsigncrypt the signcryption. Setup: This algorithm run by the PKG is similar to the original scheme in [7] , only modifications made are in the definitions of the hash functions and a new hash function H 5 is defined. These are:
Thus, the system's public parameters published by the PKG are
and master secret key s is kept secret. Extract: This algorithm is run by the PKG and is similar to the original scheme. Key-Share Distribution: This algorithm run by the PKG is also similar to the previous scheme. The PKG computes the private key share for the i th member as ∆ i = F (i), where F (.) is the Lagrange polynomial as mentioned in the previous scheme and the verification key τ i =ê(∆ i , P ), and sends ∆ i and τ i to B i (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Each user can then perform a consistency check to check the validity of their secret shares by performing the following check Correctness: To prove the correctness of I-IDBTUSC scheme, we show how the sign verification is done in SignVer algorithm:
We also show how k 2 calculated in ShareCombine is the same k 2 used in Signcryption:
Remark: The last check during unsigncryption ensures that σ is a valid signcryption from ID A to ID B . This check is needed to ensure the consistency of key generation i.e. to confirm that the message retrieved is encrypted using the same key, otherwise it will help the adversary to play with the challenge signcryption in the confidentiality game. In many identity based signcryption schemes this check is eliminated to introduce public verifiability, but without this check we will not be able to verify the signcryption validity. The proof of this theorem appears in the full version of the paper [12] .
A. Security of the Scheme (I-IDBTUSC)

VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have cryptanalysed the identity based threshold unsingcryption schemes by Fagen Li et al. in [7] and Fagen Li et al. in [8] . We showed that both these schemes do not meet the stringent requirements of insider security and demonstrate attacks on both confidentiality and unforgeability. We have also proposed an improved identity based threshold unsigncryption scheme and gave the formal proof of security in a new stronger security model in the random oracle model. Thus our improved scheme remains the only provably secure identity based threshold unsingcryption scheme.
